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Should the United States increase taxes and  welfare. Each dollar raised through the excise
tariffs in the energy sector to reduce its federal  tax on petroleum products would come at a loss
deficit?  of only one cent in welfare.
The authors used a twelve-sector general  Not only v ould an import tariff on crude oil
equilibrium model to estimate the fiscal effects,  cause much dislocation (an estimated 153,000
and the effects on welfare and employment, of  workers would have to relocate), but it would
pose trade policy  problems.
* A 25 percent import tax on imported crude
oil.  A combination of excise taxes, subsidies,
and import ta'iffs would be the least costly way
* A 15 percent excise tax on petroleum  (in terms of welfare) to raise $20 billion in
products.  government revenues.  Taxing both sectors
minimizes distortion-induced resource move-
* A combination of the two.  ments.  The welfare cost of raising $20 billion is
least when domestic petroleum production is
T.ae excise tax would be the most efficient  subsidized by the combination of an import tariff
instrument for raising revenues.  and a small subsidy to counteract the distortion
resulting from the tax on oil and gas, an input of
The 25 percent import tariff would raise  the petroleum sector.
$7.3 billion in government revenues, while the
15 percent excise tax on petroleum products  The optimal tax structure would involve a
would raise $35 billion in government revenues.  tariff and a small subsidy on petroleum products
to counteract the distortion induced by a tax on
Moreover, each dollar raised through a tariff  oil - the most important input for petroleum
on imports would come at a loss of 25 cents in  products.
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This  paper  draws  on  a  larger  study  by  Tarr  (1988)  while  he  was  at  the  U.S.
Federal  Trade  Commission.  We  thank  Bela  Balassa  for  comments  and  Maria  D.
Ameal  for  excellent  logistic  support.  The  views  are  those  of  the  authors,
not  those  of the  USFTC  nor  those  of the World  Bank.1
I.  Irtroduction
Several  proposals  have  recently been made  to increase  taxes  or
tariffs  in the  energy  sector. The  most  notable  proposals  have  concentrated
on:  (1)  an increase in  tariffs on  crude oil  imports  by $5  or $lu  per
barrel  (roughly  a tariff  of 25 to  50  percent  of the  value  of the  imported
oil);  1/ (2)  an increase  in taxes on final  petroleum  products  by between  5
and  25 cents  per  gallon  (roughly  between  5 and  25  percent  of the  value  of a
gallon  of gasoline).  2/  Domestic  petroleum  product  refiners,  however,  have
also  sought an  import tariff that  is  limited to  imports of refined
petroleum  products.  3/  During  the  1970s,  proposals  to increase  the  import
tariffs  on crude  oil were  commonly offered as devices  to counteract  the
power  of the  OPEC  cartel.  In  the late  1980s,  however,  the  most  prominent
proposals  to increase  taxation in  these  sectors are  being  offered  as a
means  of reducing  the  large US  federal budget  deficit  and  its  twin  trade
deficit. In addition,  some  argue that  it will  help the  US become  energy
independent,  4/ and  will be  relatively  painless  due  to the  recent  decline
in energy  prices. Opponents  argue  that  these  taxes  would  be very  costly  to
the  US economy  in terms  of lost US  welfare  and  in terms  of  adverse  impacts
on other  sectors.
Due  to conflicting  concerns, President Reagan  recently  asked  the
Department  of Energy  to study  whether  any  policy  changes  were  warranted  due
to the  fall  in  the  price of  energy  products. Without  proposing  specific
policies,  that study  drew the  vague  conclusion that  allenge  to
policymakers  is  to utilize  the  market where  possible  and  rwise  find
appropriate  cost-effective  action  to  the  nation's energy problems
(Department  of Energy,  1987,  p. 3).  The  purpose  of this  paper  is to study
explicitly  cost-effective  and welfare-effective  methods of dealing  with2
revenue  generation  through  taxation  of the  crude  oil  and  petroleum  products
sectors.
Previous  quantitative  studies  have  mostly  been  partial  equilibrium
exercises.  Most  made  the  unrealistic  assumption that the  demand  for
gasoline  is  perfectly  inelastic  in the  short-run,  and  very inelastic  in the
long-run. Typically,  the  tax  consequences  were dealt  with  by adopting  the
rule  of thumb  that  one  billion  dollars  of revenue  will  be generated  for  the
US government  for  each  one  cent  per gallon  tax  on gasoline  and  diesel  fuel.
Given  that  a tax  on gasoline  has strong  economy-wide  linkages,  it is  useful
to  obtain estimak.es  based  in  a  general equilibrium  context where
interactive  effects  are  accounted  for.  5/
It is  only  recently  that  two  general  equilibrium  studies  by Boyd
and  Uri  (1988a, 1988b) address the  issue of  taxation and  the  fiscal
deficit. They  have  analyzed  the welfare and  revenue  implications  of a $5
per  barrel  import  tariff  on  crude  oil,  and  a 15 cents  per  gallon  excise  tax
on  gasoline. Boyd  and  Uri  (1988b) find that  the  rule  of thumb  of one
billion dollars of  revenue for  every  cent  of  gasoline tax  is  an
overestimate  by about  50 percent, that  is,  the  government  can  be expected
to realize about one-half of  a  billion dollars per  one  cent  tax  on
gasoline. In addition,  they  estimate that  US  welfare  falls  by about  twice
the  amount  of the  gain  in  US Treasury  revenues  from  a gasoline  tax.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to reexamine  the  welfare,  fiscal,  and
employment  implications  of:  (1) a  252  import  tax  on imported  crude  oil;
and (2)  a 15?  excise  tax  on  petroleum  products. The  estimates  are  derived
from  a  12 sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model  for  the  US
economy  calibrated  to 1984. Our  estimates  are  derived  under  the  assumption3
that  the  existing  voluntary  export restraints  (VERs)  prevailing  in 1984  in
the  textiles  and  apparel  and  automobile sectors  would  remain  in effect.  6/
More  importantly,  we go  beyond the  existing literature  by answering  the
question: what is  the  least  costly  combination  (in  terms  of  US welfare)  of
taxes  and  tariffs on  the  crude  oil  and  petroleum product  sectors  to
generate  a given  amount  ($20  billion)  of US government  revenue.
The  remainder  of the  paper  is  organized as follows. Section  2
presents  the  model  and  selected elasticity specifications. Section  3
reports  on  new  welfare,  revenue  and  trade  balance  estimates  of the  proposed
tax  rates  mentioned  above. Section 4  reports  results  on the  set  of least
costly  taxes  in  the  crude  oil  and  petroleum  products  sectors  that  would
raise  $20  billion  in government  revenue. Conclusions  follow  in  section  5.
2.  The  Model  and  the  Elasticity  Specification
The  simulation  model  is  a  neoclassical,  perfect  competition,
static  CGE  Walrasian  model, in which  a representative  consumer  maximizes
utility  subject  to a  budget  constraint,  atomistic  producers  minimize  costs,
and  the  government  redistributes,  in  a lump-sum  manner,  tax  revenues. This
stylized  representation  of  government  behavior  is  of course  simplistic,  but
it  adds  great  transparency  to  the  estimation  of  the  welfare  costs  of alter-
native  taxation  schemes  designed  to  raise  government  revenue. The  economy
also  has  a fixed  endowment of  labor and  capital,  and  faces  an exogenous
balance  of trade  expressed  in foreign currency  units,  so as to  help  inter-
pretation  of the  welfare  effects of  alternative  taxation  schemes.  Our
static  representation  of the  economy  allows  us to  abstract  from  investment,
thereby  further  simplifying  the  welfare analysis.  Thus  the  components  of
final  demand  only  include  consumer  demand  and  intermediate  demand.4
2.1  The  Model
Before  sketching  the  model  formulated in  Table  1, it should  be
noted  that  the  simulations  which  apply to  1984 take  as given  the  most
important  foreign  trade  restrictions  then  in  existence,  namely  the  U.S.
VERs  on  Japanese autos  and  the  quotas on  U.S.  textile and  apparel
imports.  7/  We view  these  quotas as relatively  important  elements  in  our
analysis  since  this implies that imports of  these products  are fixed,
thereby  adding  a strong  second  best  flavor to our  estimates. Though  less
important  quantitatively,  we also  assume  that  the  existing  tariff  structure
remains  in  place. To simplify the  notation  and  presentation  of the  model,
we do  not list  among  the  equations  those  that  determine  the  rents  (RENTk  in
equations  24 and  25)  which  accrue to  foreigners,  but  the  reader  should  be
aware  that  the  value  of  the  transfer to  foreigners  implied  by the  U.S.
system  of quotas  and  VERs  depends on  the  value  of the real  exchange  rate
,vhich  is  endogenous.
The  following notation is  adopted  throughout.  If  double
subscripts  are  employed,  the  first  subscript  denotes  the  sector  of origin,
the  second  the  sector  of  destination.  Upper  case letters  are  reserved  for
endogenous  variables,  unless they have  a  bar,  in  which  case  they  are
exogenous variables or  normalizing  constants.  Parameters and  policy
variables  are  denoted  by  Greek  or  lower case  Latin  letters. There  are  i,
j =  1,  ... ,  n sectors of which k  - 1, ...  1  are traded and the remainder,
m =  1  +  1, ... ,  n are non-traded.  In the application 1 =  11 and there is
one  non-traded  sector.S
The  functional  forms  used  throughout  are  the  linear
expenditure  system  (LES)  to  denote  the  preferences  for  the
representative  consumer, the  constant elasticity of  substitution (CES)
function  to represent capital-labor  substitution  and  substitution  between
domestic and  foreign  intermedie-'s, and  the  constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) to  model  export supply.  To  save on  notation,
we note first  that CES  and  CET functions  can  be  written  analogously  in  the
form  X=CES  (Xl,  X2; a,,  1-al,  p,  A) where  a  =  p  1 < p <  @  in the  CES
case  and  a  =  1  ;  1  <  p  <  Z  in  the  CET  case.  To further  save  on  notation,
we write  the  unit  dual  cost  functions associated  with  the  CES (CET)
functions  as PX  =  CES (CET)  (PX 1, PX 2; a, a)  where  PX is  the  price  of X and
PX 1 and  PX 2 the  prices  of X1 and  X2.
The  equations  describing  the  model  appear  in  Table  1.  The  welfare
function  is the  Stone-Geary  utility function  associated  with the  consumer
demand  equations  described in  equations (19)-(20).  Our  measure  of the
welfare  cost  of a  policy  change is  given  by the  equivalent  variation  (EV)
measure  defined  as:
EV  =  C[IU(pl,  yl),  po] - C[IU(p°,  y°),  po]
where  superscripts  o and  1  refer to  the  equilibrium  before  and  after  the
counterfactual  trade  policy  experiment,  p  is  the  tax  inclusive  vector  of
final  goods  prices,  IU is the  indirect utility  function,  and  C is the  cost
or expenditure  function.  8/
To  best  capture the  trading possibilities  at  a  relatively
aggregated  level  for  an economy like  the US,  we have  treated  commodities
supplied (or purchased) abroad and  domestic commodities  sold  on the6
Table  1
U.S.  General  Equilibrium  Model
0. Welfare  Indicator
d  P
Wi  S(Ck  ki  (CMk  k
1.  Unit Cost
n
(1)  CVi  CESi (W,  R; ai,  Git ADi)  +  E  ai  Xi PCji
=  PVC  +  INTC
2.  Factor  Markets
(2)  K1 =  XD  PVC 1 (R/(l-ai))
(3)  L  =  XD  PVC  (W/ia)
(4)  E  = LS;d  - Ki  =  KS (4)  L  KL  K
3.  Intermediate  Products  Demand
(5)  Vii  CES1 (VMJH  VDj;  6,  ac1 ,  ACE )
rcj  -Urc
(6)  VD 1 1ij/VHji  =  ((1-6  )I5  )  (PDj/PMH)
(7)  VMji  O  j  e  NT
(8)  Vij  ia  Xi
4.  Output  Allocation  for  Tradables
(9)  XDk - CETk (Ek.  Dk;  7k'  Utk,  kT)
(10)  Dt/Ek  =  1-70t/7k7
Table  1  (continued)
5.  Cost  Prices
(11)  PXk  =  CETk (PEk.  PDk;  7k' a  Xk);  PX  =  PDm
(12)  PCii  =  CESJ (PMI  V,  PDi;  6i,  Uc  AC  );  PCmj  Pm ii  j  ii  ii  ji  m 
(13)  PNi =PXi  a3i Pcji
6.  Definition  of Internal  Prices  of Traded  Goods
(14)  PEk  PWEk  ER
(15)  PD i  PD  (litx) ;  tx >  0; i e  petroleum  products
i  and  crude  oil
(16)  PMk  =  PWMk (l+tmk)  (l+prck)  (l+txk)  ER  ;  prck  >  0 for  autos
and  textiles
7.  Import  Supply;  Export  Demand
(17)  PWEk  =  PWEk
(18)  P%M  =  PWM  or  VTMk = VTM  (PWMk)  ;  Ok >  0;  Ok <  w for
crude  oil
8.  Consumer  and  Intermediate  Demands
(19)  CDi  - LESi  (PDi.  Y;  di Pi)
(20)  CMk  = LESk (PM\,  Y;  )k'  Bm)
(21)  VTDi  =  E VDii  ;  VTM  =  E vIj
i  k  j
(22)  Di  VT~)  +  C  d8
Table  1 (continued)
9.  Government  Revenue  (GR),  Trade  Balance  Constraint  (B)  and  Income
Definition  (Y)
(23)  GR  =k  (PWMk  tmk (CMk  +  VTMk)  ER k
GR2  E (PDiDitxi)  +  E PWMk  txk  (l+tmk)  ER (VTMk+CMk)
2  ~~~~k
(24)  B  E  (PWEkEk  - PWMk (CMk  +  VTMk)
k
- L  (RENTk)  /  ER
k
(25)  Y  = WLS +  RKS  + GR1  +  GR2  + E  (RENTk)  ER
k
10.  Market  Equilibrium
(26)  PXi  =  cvi
11.  Numeraire
(27)  1  JEPD  XD; IEPDO  XD;
J  j 9
Table 1
Number of
Endogeneous Variables  Variables
Cvi  =  Unit costs  n
Ki  Sectoral capital stocks  n
Ld  5  Sectoral  employment  n
Vji  Composite intermediate  purchases  n2
VDji  Domestic intermediate  purchases  n2
VMji  Imported intermediate  purchases  n(n-l)
XDi  =  Gross output of sector i  n
Di  =  Supply for domestic sales  n
Ek  =  Supply for export sales  m
PXk  =  Unit revenue of traded goods  m
PDi  =  Unit price of domestically sold goods  n
PCij  =  Unit price of composite intermediates  n'
PNi  =  value-added price of sector i  n
PEk,PWEk  =  Domestic and border price of exports  m
PMk(PIWMk)  =  Domestic (border)  price of imports of
sector  k  2m
RENTCk  =  Rents on imports subject to quotas  2m
VTDi,VTMk  Total domestic and import intermediate
demands  2m+n
CMk,CDi  =  Consumer demand for imports and
domestically  produced goods  m+n
GR,Y,ER  =  Government revenue from tariff
collection, disposable income net
of transfers and real  exchange rate  3
W,R  =  Wage, rental rates  2
TOTAL  3n2+n(n-l)+9n+7m+5
Note:  Number of endogenous variables varies according to  model closure.
(See text).10
domestic  market as  imperfect substitutes.  This  assumption  of product
differentiation,  which  has  found considerable  support  at the  disaggregate
level  is commonly  used  in  applied general  equilibrium  analysis  and  is also
adopted  in  many  of the  partial equilibrium  estimates  cited  in  section  2.
On the  export  side,  the  assumption  of product  differentiation  is reflected
in  the  constant elasticity of  transformation  (CET) function between
domestic  and  foreign  sales. The  choice  of functional  forms  implies  that  oc
and  at are  respectively  the  (compensated)  price  elasticities  of demand  for
imports  and  price  elasticities  of supply  of exports.
Table  1 shows that production possibilities  are  parametrized  by
assuming  CES  functions  for value-added and  Leontief  functions  between  in-
termediates  (as  a  whole)  and  value-added,  as  well  as  within  intermediates.
However,  within  each  sector,  intermediate  demand  is  a CES  function  between
the  domestically  produced  intermediate  and  the  competing  foreign  intermedi-
ate (equations  5 and  6).  To  give an example,  no substitution  is  allowed
between  purchases  of crude oil  and  other  manufacturing  intermediates,  but
substitution  in  purchases  is  allowed  between  domestic  and  foreign  crude  oil
when  their  relative  prices  change  as  a  result  of  a change  in trade  policy.
Likewise, in  consumption  demand,  we  allow  for  non-unitary income
elasticities  of  demand and  non-zero cross-price  elasticities  of demand
between  domestic  and foreign  produced  consumer  goods  (equations  19 and  20).
Apart  from  the  existing quotas on  textiles and  autos,  the  only
distortions  are  the  existing tariffs on  imports.  Of  course  this  is  a
simplification  of  the  existing structure of  distortions,  but  for  the
purpose  of studying  the  effects of  taxation on  crude  oil  and  petroleum
products,  this  simplification  makes  results  easier  to  interpret.11
With  respect  to the  petroleum industries,  note that  we allow  for
the  possibility  of an  upward  sloping supply  curve  of imports  for  crude  oil
which  has  been suggested  by  Anderson and  Metzger  (1987). Also  note  that
positive  excise  taxes  apply  only to  the  two  petroleum  industries,  oil  and
gas  and  petroleum  products,  and  that  the  excise tax  is imposed  on top  of
the  existing  tariff  rates  (equal to  0.21 tor  oil  and  gas  and  3.1Z for
petroleum  products).
In the  experiments  reported in  section 3, we take  the  domestic
sales  tax (txi)  and  tariffs on  the  oil  and  gas  and  petroleum  products
sectors  as  an exogenous  policy  instrument.  We ask  what  are  the  revenue  and
welfare  effects  of imposing  taxes  and  tariffs at the  proposed  levels. On
the  other  hand,  in  the  experiments  reported in section  4,  we ask  what  are
the  values  of txi  and  tmi,  for  the  oil  and  gas  and  the  petroleum  products
sectors  which  maximize  welfare given by the  Stone-Geary  indicator  subject
to  the  constraint  that  we  must increase  government  revenue  by $20  billion.
2.2  Elasticity  Specification  for  the  Energy  Sectors  9/
The  model  has  twelve  sectors:  Agriculture;  Mining;  Crude  Oil  and
Natural Gas; Food;  Textiles  and  Apparel; Automobiles; Steel; Other
Manufacturing;  Other  Consumer Goods; Petroleum  Products;  Traded  Services;
Non-Traded  Services. The  classification  provides  for  a disaggregation  of
mining  and  manufacturing  so as  to encompass  five  important  policy  sectors:
automobiles,  textiles  and  apparel, and  steel on  which  VERs  have recently
been  in effect;  and  crude  oil  and  natural  gas  and  petroleum  products  which
are  the  subject  of the  policy  experiments  in  this  paper. Because  the  model
is  calibrated  to 1984,  we  assume that ex'sting  import  quotas  on textiles12
and  apparel  and  automobiles  would  remain in  effect  under  the  alternative
taxation  schemes  analyzed  here.
The  structure  of  demand, the  level of output  and  employment  and
the  selected  elasticities  for  the  two  energy sectors  appear  in  table  2.
The  structure  of  demand indicates that imports are  a  larger  share  of
domestic  supply  in the  oil  and  gas  sector and  the  oil  and  gas  sector  is
also  the  more labor  intensive sector.  All  sales from  the  oil  and  gas
sector  are  sales  to  other sectors.  Thus,  an increase  in that  sector  s
relative  price  will  have  a negative supply  effect  on sectors  which  use  oil
and  gas  intensively  as  an  intermediate  input, in  particular,  for  the
petroleum  products  sector where  purchases from  the  oil  and  gas  sector
comprise  56.3  percent  of its  total  costs.
Turning  to  the  elasticity  estimates  in  the  bottom  half  of table  2,
we use  Caddy's  (1976)  estimate of  0.8  for  the  elasticity  of substitution
between  capital  and  labor  for  both  sectors. Likewise,  we use  an identical
estimate of  2.4  for  the  compensated  price elasticity of  demand  for
intermediate  imports  (Stern,  Francis  and  Schumacher  (1976)). A compensated
price  elasticity  of supply  of  US exports of 3 is  assumed  for  both sectors.
The  insignificant  value  of exports  in  both  sectors,  and  earlier  experiments
reported  in  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (1988), suggest that  results  are  quite
insensitive  to  a  wide  range of values for  this parameter. The  price
elasticity  of final  demand  for domestic  and  imported  petroleum  products  is
assumed  to  be  -0.92  (an average of  estimates of  (-0.79)  reported  in
Shiells,  Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986)  and  of (-0.96)  reported  in Stern,
Francis  and  Schumacher (1976)).  Finally, a  price  elasticity  of final
demand  of -0.5  is  assumed for  crude oil  (Bohi and  Russell  (1978))  and
petroleum  products.13
Table 2:
Production, Demand Structure  and Elasticities in US Petroleum Industry
Petroleum
Oil +  Gas  Products
Production and Demand (1984  US$ billion)
Gross Output (XD)  157.3  217.2 (56.3Z)  a/
Employment (L)  619.0  204.u
Domestic Final Demand Sales (CD)  0.07  45.7
Intermediate Sales (VD)  156.4  167.3
Imports:  Intermediates (VM)  43.6  16.6
Final Demand (CM)  0.02  4.5
Price and Substitution  Elasticities
Capital-Labor (ap)  0.8  0.8
Imports:  Final demand (uncompensated)  -0.5  -0.9
Intermediates (ac)  2.4  2.4
Domestic:  Final demand (uncompensated)  -0.5  -0.9
Export Supply (at)  2.9  2.9
a/  Percent of (direct)  total  costs attributable to intermediate  purchases
from the oil and gas sector.14
In  most simulations,  we rely  on  the  above  values  for  elasticities
which  we refer  to as the  central  elasticity  case. However,  to check  on the
sensitivity  of results,  we also carried  out  experiments  for  low  elasticity
and  high elasticity  cases. The  low  (high)  elasticity  case  is  obtained  by
reducing  (augmenting)  the  values of  the  elasticities  in  table  2  by one
standard  deviation. Finally,  we also  experiment  with values  of 1 and  3 for
the foreign  elasticity  of supply of  imported crude  oil,  which  are in  the
range  suggested  by Anderson  and  Metzger  (1987).
3.  Revenue  and  Welfare  Effects  of Proposed  Taxation  of US Petroleum
Industries
We report  first  in  section  3.1  the  revenue,  welfare  and  employment
effects  of tariffs  on imports of  oil  and  gas  products  and  of a domestic
sales  tax  on petroleum  products  for  the  central  elastic ,  case.  Next,  in
section  3.2,  we establish  the  likely upper  and lower  bounds  of the  welfare
costs  per  dollar  of  government revenue generated  and  also  per  additional
percent  of taxation.
3.1  Revenue  Employment  and  Welfare  Estimates
Table  3  shows that about  five times more  revenue would  be
generated  by the  proposed excise tax  on  petroleum products  than  by the
import  tariff  on oil  and  gas. This  is  to be expected  since  the  excise  tax
applies  to  all  domestic  sales  amounting  to $234  billion,  whereas  the  import
tariff  has  a  much smaller base of  $43.6 billion. It is  also  noteworthy
that  the  excise  tax  on  petroleum products  is  much less  distortionary  than
the  import  tariff on  oil  and  gas  products.  Thus,  an  excise  tax  on
petroleum  products  raises  about  five times more  reverue  than  a tariff  onTable  3:
Revenue,  Welfare  and Emplozment Effects  of  Taxation
on the  US Petroleum  Industry
Increase  in  Employment  Chrne 
Government  I  Change  I  Petroleum'  Economy  Wide
I  Revenue  in  Welfare  I  Oil  +  Gat  Products  I  Employment Relocation
Experiment  I  (billion  8 1984)  I  (bill'ion  3  1984)  I  (thousand  work-years)  I  (thousand  work-years) I.  '~~~~~~~~~~~I
25X import tariff  lIl 
on oil  +  gas  (E-1)  7.29  1  -1.88  l  6388  I-232  163.64
16%  excis-taxon  I  a n  I  I
domestic  sale  of  l  I  I  I
petroleum  products  1  34.99  1  -0.32  I  -7.01  1  -4.33  I  32.67
in  (E-2)  l  I  I  I
(E-1)  +  (E-2)  I  42.78  I  -2.34  l  5e.12  I  -6.51 I  182.07
p/  One-half  of  the  sum of  the  absolute  valuo  of  the  employment changes  (expressed  in  thousand work  years).16
imported  oil  and  gas  products  at a  welfare  cost  which  is only  37  percent  of
the  welfare  cost  of raising  revenue  by  the  import  tariff. The reasons  for
this  large  discrepancy  between  the  two  revenue-raising  instruments  is that
an  excise  tax  applies  to  all  sales  Pa.d  is  therefore  non-discriminatory  by
source. We elaborate  on this  point  below.
The  employment effects of  the  import tariff on  oil  and  gas
products  shows  that  this method of  raising  government  revenue  would  have
labor  relocation  effects  across the  entire economy.  The  last  column  of
table  3 is  a measure  of the  total  economy-wide  relocation  of  workers. The
value  of that  measure shows that  interindustry  effects  are  strong,  since
153.6  thousand workers would  be  relocated but  among  these only  66.2
_..usand  would  be relocating in  the  energy  industries.  The  economy-wide
relocation  effect  is even  stronger  for  the  proposed  sales  tax  on  petroleum
products:  only  11.3  thousand  workers relocate  within  the  en -gy
industries,  whereas  32.7 thousand relocate in non-energy sectors. The
relatively  smaller  effect  on  employment in  the  petroleum  products  sector
compared  with the  tariff on  oil  and  gas  imports is  due  to the  non-
discriminatory  feature  of an  excise  sales tax  which  applies  to domestic  as
well  as to import  sales. Since 77  percent  of petroleum  products  sales  are
to  other  sectors and  we  do  not  allow for  substitution  in  intermediate
inputs  of a different sector of  origin,  purchasers  of  petroleum  products
cannot shift to  other  inputs.  Such an  assumption is  of  course  a
simplification  which  is  only  likely  to  hold  for  the  short  to  medium  run.
In interpreting  the  results  in  table 3,  one  should  bear  in  mind
that  the  estimated  figure on  government  revenue  from  the  proposed  excise
tax  is  probably  an  upper  bound estimate.  This  is  because  an increase  in
the  relative  price  of oil  and  gas  or  of petroleum  products  would  induce17
users  to shift  to other  sources of  energy like  coal. The  possibility  to
susbtitute  out  of petroleum  industries in  response  to  an excise  tax  would
both lower  the  welfare  cost  of  the  excise  tax  and  the  government  revenue
raised  by the  excise  tax. Finally  note  that  if the  US could  be assumed  to
have  monopsony  power  on  oil  and  gas  (an  unrealistic  assumption),  there
would  be a  welfare  gain  after  imposition  of the  tariff,  because  of improved
terms  of trade.
3.2  Relative  Efficiency  of  Proposed  Taxes
We now  evaluate  the  relative efficiency  of the  proposed  revenue-
raising  tax  schemes  relying  on two  indicators: (a)  welfare  cost  per  dollar
of government  revenue  raised; and  (b) billions of dollars  of government
revenue  per  additional  one  percent  tax. These  indicators  appear  in columns
(3)  and (4)  of table  4 for  simulations  under  low  and  high  elasticities.  We
also  compare  our  result  with previous  estimates.
Low  elasticities  result in  more  government revenue and  less
welfare  cost  for  each  tax  scheme.  Why  this is  so is shown  in figure  1
which  illustrates  in  partial  equilibrium  the  effect  of  high  and low  elasti-
cities  on the  welfare and  revenue effect of  a tariff  on import  demand.
Initially,  equilibrium  is  at  (PMO, VMo) with  infinitely  elastic  import
supply  of intermediates.  Ignoring  shifts  in the  (derived)  demand  for
imported  intermediates  after  the  imposition  of an import  tariff,  the  new
equilibrium  shifts  to (PML,VM 1) in the  low  elasticity  case  and  to (PM,VM  )
in  the  high  elasticity  case. It  is  clear  that  the  welfare  costs,  given  by
W =  1/2 (PM 1 - PMO) (VM 1 - VMO),  is greater in the high elasticity case,
and  the  government  revenue,  given  by (PM 1 - PMO)  VM 1, is  higher  in the  low
elasticity  case.  This  observation  corresponds  to the  prescription  of Pigou
(1947,  p  105),  based  on  partial  equilibrium  analysis:Table  4:
Welfare  Costs  per  Dollar  of  Tax Revenue
(USS 1984 billion)
I  Change  in  |  I  Billion  of  Revenue
Government  I Change in  I  Welfare  I  per  Additional
Elasticity  I Revenue  I  Welfare  I  Revee  u  Percent  Tax
(1)  (  (2)  I  (2)*(1)  I  (4)
26X import  tariff  I  L  8.9  -1.0  I  -0.11  1  0.38
on oil  and  gas  I  H  I  4.9  -3.0  I  -0.61  I  0.20
25  import tariff  I  L3 /  1  8.2  1  4.4  .0.S4  I  0.33
on oil  and gas:  US  I  H /  I  7.8  I  1.7  I  0.22  I  0.31
has  monopsony  power
in  oil  and  gas
25%  excise  tax  on  I  L  I  49.7  1  -0.3  I  -0.01  I  1.99
co  domestic  sales  of  I  H  I  47.3  I  -1.1  1  -0.02  I  1.89
W-4  oil  and  gas  I  1  1  1  1
16X  excise tax  on  I  L  I  36.3  I  -0.1  I  -0.00  1  2.36
domstic  sales of  I  H  I  34.4  I  -0.7  I  -0.02  I  2.29
petroleum products
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I  __  _  I  __  _  I  __  _  I  I_  _  1  _  _  _  _  _
Note:  the  265  import  tariff  is  added to  the  existing  0.2% tariff.
p/  Central  elasticity  case for  all  parameters  except  the  import  supply  elasticity  (E6)  of  oil-gas  imports m  Es
(L:  Co  =  1.0;  H:  Co =  3.0).19
Figure  1:  IMPORT  DEMAND  ELA';TICITY  AND  WELFARE  LOSS
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ABE - Welfare  loss  (low elasticity).
ACD - Welfare loss (high  elasticity).20
'the  best way of  raising  a  given  revenue ...  is by a
system of  taxes,  under  which  the  rates become
progressively  higher as we  pass  from uses  of  very
elastic  demand  or supply  to  uses  where  demand  or supply
are  progressively  less  elastic."  10/
Next,  it  is  clear that  raising revenue by  taxes  which  do  not
discriminate  by country  of  origin  is more efficient. This  is  clearly  seen
by comparing  the  proposed  import  tariff on  oil  and  gas  with an  excise  tax
on domestic  sales  of oil  and  gas.  Not  only  does  the  excise  tax  raise  far
more revenue because it  applies to  all  domestic sales, but  it  also
generates  revenue  at a  much lower welfare cost  than  an import  tariff  (see
column  3).
3.3  Comparison  with Earlier  Studies
In  their  partial equilibrium study for  the  US  Federal  Trade
Commission,  Anderson  and  Metzger (1987) estimated that  a $5  per  barrel
import  tariff  on both  crude oil  and  petroleum  products  will generate  $6.7
billion  per  year for  the  government,  but  at a cost  of $3.8  billion  in dead-
weight  losses. Since  the  bulk  of  the  government  revenues  generated  by
tariffs  in our  model  derive  from  the  crude  oil  tariff,  our  estimate  of the
government  revenue  generated  is  within their  range  (see  table  4).  Their
implied  estimate  of the  welfare costs per  dollar  of revenue  generated  (55
cents)  is on  the  high  side  of  those we present  in table  4, but  within  our
range.  11/
Only  Boyd  and  Uri  have  conducted  general  equilibrium  experiments
similar  to those  discussed in  this  section.  They  estimate  (1988a)  the
effects  of  a $5  per  barrel import fee  on  crude  oil  and  the  effects  (in21
1988b)  of  a 15  cents  per  gallon tax  on  gasoline. These  taxes  are  about
equal  to our  25 percent import fee  on  crude oil  and  15  percent  tax  on
petroleum  products. They  estimate that the  $5  per  barrel  import  fee  on
crude  oil  will result  in $3.4  billion of government  revenue,  and  come  at
a  cost  of $208  million  in  lost social  welfare.  The  welfare  to  government
revenue  ratio  (6.1  percent)  is  about half  the  value  of our  low  elasticity
estimate  (see  table  4).
In the  case  of a 15  cents per  gallon  excise  tax  on gasoline,  Boyd
and  Uri (1988b)  find  that  it  will generate  $8 billion  in  government  revenue
at  a cost  of $15  billion  in  welfare.  Thus:  (a)  each  dollar  of  government
revenue  comes  at a  cost  of  almost $2  in  welfare  (compared  with less  than
two  cents  of  welfare  costs  in  our  case); and  (b)  for  each  one  cent (or
percent)  tax  on gasoline,  they  find  the  government  receives  about  one-half
of a  billion  dollars  in  revenue (compared  with about  $2.30  billion  in  our
case). Since  Boyd  and  Uri  apply  the  tax  only  on final  demand  for  gasoline,
not on intermediate  demand, and  our  experiments  apply  the  excise  tax  on
both  intermediate  and  final  demand,  we  are  applying  the  tax  to a  base 4.7
times  larger. Adjusted for  the  size of  the  tax  base,  our  results  on
dollars  of revenue  obtained  per  percent of  tax  are  very  close. We choose
our  formulation  rather than  theirs,  since arbitrage would  make  it
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  tax  only  final  demand  for  gasoline,  and
because  the  proposals  to  apply  a  tax  on  gasoline  do  not  envision  excluding
intermediate  usage  from  taxation.  However, we  find it  difficult  to
reconcile  our  estimate  of  the  ratio of welfare costs  per  dollar  of tax
revenues  raised  from  excise  taxes  with  the  unusually  high  estimate  of Boyd
and  Uri.  12/22
4.  Efficient  Taxation  of US Petroleum  Industries
Partial  equilibrium  analysis suggests that  the  least  burdensome
way to impose  excise  taxes  to raise  a  given  amount  of revenue  is to levy  a
set  of excise  taxes  that  vary  inversely  with  the  elasticity  of final  demand
of the  sector.  When  general equilibrium  interactions  are  taken  into
account,  rules  are  more  difficult  to derive,  and  numerical  calculations  are
computationally  difficult  to obtain.  Consequently,  there  has been  little
empirical  work on the  subject. Two  previous  numerical  exercises  of optimal
tax  or  tariff calculations  are  Harris and  MacKinnon (1979)  and  Dahl,
Devarajan and  van  Wijnbergen (1986).  The  former paper  develops  an
algorithm for  the  calculation  of  optimal taxes  and  provides  largely
illustrative  examples.  The  latter paper calculates  optimal  tariffs  for
Cameroon,  and  investigates  the  conditions  under which  departures  from  a
uniform  tariff  structure  are  optimal.  The  latter  study  does  not,  however,
numerically  consider  the  interaction  of taxes  with tariffs.
We now  ask  what  is  the  least costly way, in terms  of foregone
welfare,  to  raise  a  specified  amount  of  government  revenue.
Computationally,  we choose  the  tariff  (tm) and  the  excise  tax  rate (tx)  in
the  oil  and  gas  and  petroleum products  industries  which  maximize  welfare
subject  to the  additional constraint that  the  application  of these  taxes
raise  government  revenue  by $20  billion.  To simplify  the  computation  and
interpretation  of  results in  this  section, assume that VERs  are  not
binding. However,  we  maintain  the  existing tariffs  in  other  sectors.
Computations  are  done with  the  MINOS5 algorithm available  from  Brooke,
Kendrick  and  Meeraus  (1988).
The  results  of  the  computation  of  optimal tax  rates  appear  in
table  5.  The  calculations  are  labelled 0  (oil  and  gas)  and  O+P (oil  and23
Table 5:
Optimal Taxes to Raise $20 Billion in Government Revenue
(Central  Elasticity Case)
Industry  Taxation  (0)  (P)  (0+P)  (O+P)
es =  3.0
m
Oil +  Gas  tm  2.4  2.7  36.3
tx  9.6  10.6  4.9
Petroleum Products  tm  2.0  8.9  5.2
tx  8.7  -1.4  -0.3
Change in Welfare (EV)  -0.12  -0.10  -0.07  +2.424
gas  +  petroleum  products)  to  reflect which  industries  are  being  taxed  to
raise  government  revenue.
A number  of results  stand  out  from  a comparison  of the  alternative
least  costly  taxation  schemes  to  raise $20  billion  in  government  revenue.
First,  if taxation  is allowed  in  both  energy  sectors,  the  welfare  cost  of
raising  $20  billion  is  less than when  taxation is only  allowed  for  one
sector  only. This  is an illustration  of the  principle  that  a given  revenue
objective  can  be achieved  at a  lower  cost  with  additional  tax  instruments,
because  the  additional  tax  instruments  can  be  used  to reduce  the  size  of
the  wedge  created  by the  objective of  raising the  tax.  That  is,  all  the
distortion  does  not fall  on  one sector  causing  resources  to flow  out  of the
sector.  If  all  sectors could  be  taxed, distortion-induced  resource
movements  would  be  minimized.
Second,  when revenues  are raised by  taxing  only  one  sector,  then
an  excise  tax  is less  costly  than a  tariff  at the  same  rate  because  it is
neutral  as to source. Thus,  the  least  costly  combination  of excise  tax  and
import  tariff  rates  will involve  a  higher  excise  tax  rate  than  tariff  rate.
When  both instruments  can  be used  for  one  industry  at a time,  the  optimal
combination  suggested  by the  results in  columns (0)  and (P)  is  that  the
excise  tax  rate  should  be set  at  a  rate  about  four  times  higher  than  the
import  tariff  rate.
The fact  that  the  excise tax  is  the  preferred  instrument  to a
tariff  is  an illustration  of  the  principle, shown  by  Dixit (1985),  that
domestic  goods  and  factor taxes or  subsidies  are  superior  instruments  to
tariffs  for  the  purpose of  raising revenue.  This  is  because  a tariff
induces  domestic  resources  to  flow  into the  industry  when the  product  can
be obtained  at a  lower  relative price  through  international  trade,  but the
excise  tax  does  not  discriminate  as to source. The  question  that  naturally25
arises  then  is that  given  that  the  excise  tax  is  preferred  to tariffs,  why
are  there  any  tariffs  (albeit  small ones)  in  the  optimum. The  answer  to
this  question  is that  we have  limited the  use  of excise  taxes  to the  two
energy  sectors,  so that  other  sectors  are  untaxed. When  the  energy  sectors
are  taxed,  but  others  are  not,  resources  flow  out  of the  energy  sectors  and
into  the  rest  of the  economy. This  is  a distortion  that  is  reduced  through
the  use  of  a  tariff.  This principle is  discussed further below,
illustrated  in figure  2,  and  der4ved by  Dahl,  Devarajan  and  van  Wijnbergen
(1986)  for  the  case  of zero  cross  elasticity  of final  demand.  13/
Third,  when  both sectors  can  be taxed  simultaneously,  the  pattern
of optimal  taxation  is  strongly influenced  by the  interdependence  between
the  two  sectors. The  results  in  columns  labelled  (O+P)  are  understood  when
one  realizes  that  a tax  on  crude  oil  is,  in  effect,  a tax  on petroleum
products. This results  in a second best  situation  where  the  output  of the
petroleum  sector  is  too  low,  because it is  being  taxed  indirectly,  and  the
non-energy  sectors  are  not  bv.4ng  taxed. As above,  we understand  the  reason
for  the  tariffs  by  recognizing  that  the  sectors  that  receive  relatively
high  excise  taxation  require some tariff  protection  to reduce  distortion-
induced  resource  movement.  In  figure 2,  we illustrate  the  situation  in
partial  equilibrium.  A tax  on  crude  oil  shifts  up the  supply  curve  for  the
petroleum  industry  to S(l+tx),  creating  a distortion  (equal  to area  ABC)  in
the  market  for  domestic  petroleum  products.  This  results  in a second  best
situation  where  output  of the  petroleum  sector  is too  low,  because  the  non-
energy  sectors  are  not  being  taxed.  A tariff,  tm,  on impo:ted  petroleum
products  or,  for  that  matter,  a subsidy  for  domestic  producers  of  petroleum
products  will  reduce this  distortion.  Figure 2  illustrates  how  the
distortion  is  reduced  by  raising the  tariff on  petroleum  products. AnFigure  2:
Welfare  Impact  on  Domestic  Petroleum  Products  of a  Tariff  on Imported  Petroleum  Products,
Given  an  Excise  Tax  on  Crude  Oil
Price  Price
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a/  txc  is the  excise  tax  on  crude  oil  products.27
increase  in  the  tariff on  imported petroleum products will induce  an
increase in  demand for  its  principal substitute,  domestic petroleum
products,  from  D0 to D'.  This will  reduce the  distortion  costs  in  the
domestic  petroleum  products  industry  (caused  by  the  tax  on crude  oil)  from
ABC  to  ADE.
The  results  in  column  (O+P)  support  this  interpretation:  rates  of
taxation  in  oil  and  gas  are  at  abolut  the  same  values  as in  the  case  where
taxation  is  only  on  the  oil  and  gas  sector, but  domestic  petroleum
production  is subsidized  by the  combination  of an import  tariff  and  a small
subsidy. Of course,  the  net  effective  subsidy  on petroleum  production  is
negative  and  about  equal  to -4.6  (=  1.4  +  (.563  *  10.6])  since  purchases
from  the  oil  and gas  sector  comprise 56.3Z  of total  costs  of the  petroleum
products  sector.
Fourth,  note from the  (0+P) column, that the  excise  taxes  and
tariff  rates  are  not  uniform  between the  two  sectors. It has  been  shown
(see  Atkinson and  Stiglitz, 1980) that with  perfectly  inelastic  labor
supply,  a uniform excise tax  is  optimal for  revenue  raising  purposes.
Since  a  uniform  tax  on all  goods is  equivalent  to a tax  on labor  alone,  a
uniform  tax  will  minimize distortion induced resource  movement  if  labor
supply  is perfectly  inelastic.
With  nonconstant  labor  supply,  it is  optimal  to tax  goods  that  are
good  substitutes  with  leisure at  a  lower  rate to  minimize  distortion-
induced  consumption  of leisure.  A fully  uniform  tax  is  not  possible  in  our
case,  because  we  have  not  allowed taxation of  the  non-energy  sectors.
Analogous  to the  labor-leisure  problem,  we want  to tax  at a lower  rate  the
good  that  is  a better  substitute for  untaxed goods  in the  system. Since
petroleum  products  are  the  better substitute for  the  other  goods,  it  has
the  lower  tax.28
As a final  illustration,  the  last column of  table  5  presents
results  where  the  US is  assumed to  possess monopsony  power  on  world  oil
markets. It considers  the  effect  of  an  upward  sloping  supply  curve  of oil
and  gas  imports  on the  selection of  optimal  taxation  of both  industries.
Not surprisingly,  the  optimal taxation is  now  dominated  by the  optimal
tariff  on  oil  and  gas  imports which  is  set  close  to the  rule  of thumb
welfare  maximizing  value (l/(l+ES)). Now  the  welfare  gains  from  improved
terms  of trade  dominate  the  calculations  and  welfare  actually  increases  by
$2.7  billion.  Given  the  ability to raise  revenue  in a  welfare  enhancing
manner  through  a tariff  on  crude  oil,  all  other  taxes  (which  are  otherwise
welfare  reducing) are  scaled down accordingly.  Of  course,  this  last
simulation  is  only  illustrative  since  it  ignores  both  the  possibility  of
retaliation  acid  the  case  of  a  non-constant  import  supply  elasticity.  Both
considerations  would lead to  a  lower optimal tariff rate  than  the  one
appearing  in table  5.
How  much  efficiency  would  be  gained  by the  application  of optimal
tax  rates  instead  of those  proposed?  We consider  two  experiments.  First,
recall  from  table  4  that  a 15Z  excise  tax  on petroleum  products  would  raise
$35  billion  in  government revenue.  Allowing the  optimal  combination  of
import  and  excise taxes in  petroleum products alone  (2.4Z  and  15.1Z,
respectively)  would  reduce the welfare cost of  raising $35  billion  in
revenue  from  $320  million  to $300  million.  In  this  case  the  welfare  gains
of optimal  taxation  are  small, since the  base  experiment  used  only  excise
taxes  and  was close  to the  optimum. Second,  recall  from  table  3  that  $42.8
billion  is raised  by the  combination  of a 25Z  import  fee  on  crude  oil  and  a
15?  excise  tax  on petroleum. The welfare  cost  of raising  $42.8  billion  by
optimum  taxation  (with  a set  of  rates proportional  to those  in  column  O+P29
of table  5) falls  from  $2.34 billion to  $276  million. Welfare  gains  of
optimal  taxation  are  much  larger in  this  case because  the  baseline  tax
rates  bear  little  relationship  to the  optimal  taxation  pattern  for  the  two
industries.
5.  Conclusions
The  estimates  in  this  paper  suggest  that  an import  tariff  on crude
oil  imports  would  be a  very  inefficient  way to reduce  the  US trade  deficit.
A tariff  would  cause much  dislocation (an  estimated  153  thousand  workers
would  have to  relocate) because sectors using crude  oil  would  have  to
adjust  to the  25  percent  tariff  on oil  imports. Moreover,  the  welfare  cost
of such  a proposed  revenue-raising  tax  scheme  would  be large,  resulting  in
an  estimated  welfare  loss  of 25  cents  for  every  dollar  of raised  revenue.
The  paper  shows  that  an excise  tax would  be a  more efficient  tax  scheme  to
raise  revenue,  resulting  in  both a  larger  revenue  per  additional  percent
tax (because  of a larger  tax  base) and  a  much lower  welfare  cost  which  we
estimate  in the  neighborhood  of 1 to  2 cents  per  dollar  of raised  revenue.
Besides  being  an  inefficient  instrument for  raising  revenue,  an
import  tariff  on  crude  oil would  pose  several  problematic  trade  policy
issues  for  the  U.S.  To begin with,  because  U.S. tariffs  on crude  oil  are
'bound"  in  the  GATT,  any  rate  increase  would  require  compensation  on  other
products. Furthermore,  the  GATT  specifically  prohibits  the  imposition  of
import  fees  for  fiscal purposes (Article  VIII:l(a)).  Finally,  an  oil
import  fee  would  also  complicate  U.S.  trade  relations  with  Canada,  Mexico,
and  Venezuela.
The  paper  also  provides  estimates of the  least  costly  combination
of excise  tax  and  import tariffs in  the  crude  oil  and  petroleum  products30
sectors  to raise  a  predetermined  amount of  government  revenue. Because
taxation  is restricted to  those  two  sectors only,  and  because  of the
linkages  between  the  two  sectors,  the  set  of optimal  taxes  and  tariffs  is
far  from  uniform. The  least  costly  combination  of tariffs  and  excise  taxes
in the  energy  sectors include taxation of  crude oil (which  has  a lower
elasticity  of  net  demand than petroleum products and  is  hence  a  more
efficient  revenue-raiser)  combined  with  a  tariff and  a small  subsidy  on
petroleum  products  to  counteract the  distortionary  costs  induced  by the
taxation  of crude  oil  which  accounts for  nearly  two-thirds  of the  value  of
intermediate  purchases  by the  petroleum  products  sector.31
Footnotes
1/  See  the  U.S. General Accounting  Office (1986) for  a survey  of
these  results.
2/  See  Committee  on  Ways and Means  (1987),  Congressional  Budget
Office  (1988),  Alan  Greenspan  (1988)  and  the  Department  of  Eneryv
(1987).
3/  See  Anderson  and  Metzger  (1987).
4/  The  energy  independence  issue is not  an  argument  for  taxation,
since  with  an  exhaustible  resource  such as oil,  the  faster  it  is
utilized  in  the  present,  the  less  will  be  available  in  the  future,
if  prices  should  rise.  Moreover,  applying  the  principle  of  using
the  most  direct instrument  for the noneconomic  objective  (see
Bhagwati  and  Srinivasan  (1969) and  Bhagwati  (1971)),  stockpiling
is  a less  costly  alternative,  if  this  argument  is  taken  seriously.
See  Anderson  and  Metzger  (1987)  for  further  details.
5/  Policy  issues  relating  to  the energy  sector  have  previously  been
addressed  in  a  general equilibrium  framework.  These  studies
however,  usually  related  to  long-run  alternatives  to  petroleum  as
an  energy  input. Examples  of  earlier  efforts  include  Hudson  and
Jorgenson  (1974),  Manne  (1976) and Borges and  Goulder  (1984).
These  studies,  however,  do  not  specifically  address  the  issue  of
tixation.  Manne  (1984) provides  a  critical survey of these
earlier  studies.
6/  The  welfare  implications  of  US  VERs  negotiated  for  autos,  textiles
and  steel  are  examined  in  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (1988).
7/  The  welfare  costs  of  these quotas are  discussed  in  de  Melo  and
Tarr (1988).
8/  See  Varian  (1984)  for  a  justification  of  this  measure.
9/  The  elasticity  specification  for  the  other  sectors  is  given  in the
appendix.
10/  See  Atkinson and  Stiglitz (1980, pp.  366-70) for a detailed
discussion.
11/  Because  it  does not  consider the effects on  the  real  exchange
rate,  other  things  equal, partial equilibrium  analysis  will  tend
to  overestimate  the  welfare  costs of  tariff  increases.  That  is,
in  general  equilibrium,  a tariff increase  will  induce  a reduction
in  imports.  This  will have the  effect  of  appreciating  the  real
exchange  rate  to  bring  about equilibrium  in  the  balance  of  trade.
In  the  new  equilibrium,  exports  will be reduced. That  reduction
in exports is  an addition  to  the consumption  of  domestic
consumers,  whose  welfare is  increased  accordingly.  Simulations
with  this  model  (see de Melo  and Tarr, 1988),  suggest  about  a
fifty  percent  overestimate  of  the welfare  costs  of tariffs,  when
the  impact  on  the  real  exchange  rate  is  ignored.32
Anderson  and  Metzger  also  consider the  case  of an  upward  sloping
import  supply curve for  imported crude  oil  and  for  gasoline.
Since  they  assume  that  a  tariff on  crude  oil  not  only  has  the
effect  of lowering  the  import supply price  of crude  oil,  but  at
the  same  time  has  the  effect of  raising the  price  of imported
gasoline, they  have  competing  terms-of-trade  effects that
neutralize  each  other.
12/  As we discuss  below,  both  theory and  our  estimates  indicate  that
excise  taxes  impose lower welfare costs per  dollar  of revenue
raised  than  tariffs. This  also makes  it  difficult  to explain  the
welfare results of  Boyd  and Uri,  since their  results  imply
dramatically  higher  welfare costs per  dollar of revenue  raised
using  excise  taxes  versus  tariffs.
13/  In  addition, the  base  data  contains a  non-uniform tariff
structure. When  we  allow the  tariffs in  the  energy  sectors  to
seek  optimal  levels, the  optimal values will  partly  offset  the
distortions  of the  base  tariff  structure.
14/  Our  selection of  elasticities  yield  comparable substitution
possibilities  at the  intermediate  level, but  crude  oil  is a  pure
intermediate  product,  so  net  elasticities  of demand  are  different
between  the  two  sectors.33
Appendix:
Elasticity  Specification
Table  Al describes  the  complete set  of elasticities  used  in the
model  for  the  central elasticity calculations.  The  "low"  and "high"
elasticity  elasticity  results  are  derived by  simulating  the  model  with a
set  of elasticities  derived  from  those  in  table  Al by subtracting  (adding)
one  standard  deviation.Table  Al:
Elasticity  Specification  (Central  Case)
Elasticity  of
Elasticity  of  Elasticity  of  Transformation  Price  Elasticities
Substitution  Substitution  Domestic/Export  of  Final  Demand  Premia
Column  Notes  Intermediates  (.)  Capital/Labor  Sales  Domestic  Inports Rates
Sector  (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Agriculture  a  c  *  k  f  1.4  0.6  4.0  0.76  0.8
Food  a  c  *  f  f  0.3  0.6  3.0  0.80  1.1
Mining  b  b  a  j  f  0.5  0.8  3.0  0.50  1.0
Crude  Oil  and  Natural
Gas  f  c  *  j  *,f,e  2.4  0.8  8.0  .6  .9
Iron  and  Steel  a  d  *  i  t  8.0  1.0  8.0  1.0  1.4
Motor Vehicles  a  c  *  h  h  2.0  0.8  S.0  1.2  1.1  22.8X
Textiles  and Apparel  a  c  *  I  t  2.6  1.0  8.0  0.4  8.9  40.56
Other Manufactures  a  c  *  f  f  836  0.8  8.0  1.5  1.8
Other Consumr  a  c  a  f  3.2  0.8  8.0  1.9  2.4
Petroleum  Products  f  c  *  J,e  *  f  2.4  0.8  a.0  .5  .9
Traded  Services  b  c  *  g  9  2.0  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6
Ron-Traded Services  b  g  0.8  0.5
C.)  CES  and CET  functions  Imply that  the  corresponding  elasticities  of  substitution  (transformation)  correspond  to  compensated
import demand  (export  supply) elasticities.
All  price  elasticities  of  demand  defined  as positive  numers. For  premis  estimates  see  de M-lo  and Tarr  (1988).
Column  notes  correspond  to  the sources  from  which  stimates  are Interpolated.  For  Interpolation  details  se  Tarr  (1988).
(a)  Shiolls,  Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986);  (b)  Dixon  *t  al.  (1982); (c)  Caddy  (1976);  (d)  Hlkman;  (e)  own  estimate  s  (f)  Stern,
Francis  and  Schumacher  (1976);  (9)  Houthakkor  and Talyor  (1970);  (h)  Levinsohn;  (i)  Crandall  (1981);  (j)  Bo%i  and  Russell
(1978);  (k)  USDA  (1984);  (l)  Hufbauer  t  al.  (1986).35
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